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Previous chapters in this book have presented new series of nominal and
real wages for the antebellum period and have used the new series, as well
as other data, to examine the behavior of labor markets. This chapter uses
these findings and others to construct the new interpretation of antebellum
wages and labor markets sketched in the introduction.
7.1 Real Wages in the Long Run
Charting economic growth before the Civil War has long occupied the
attention of economic historians. For the benchmark census years of 1840
and 1860, sufficient economic data are available in the federal censuses
and other documents to produce fairly reliable estimates of per capita in-
comes (Gallman 1966). For the period before 1840, however, there is much
less certainty over the long-run growth rate of per capita income. The
most recent estimates for the pre-1840 period are those of Thomas Weiss
(1992), based on the so-called conjectural method (David 1967). Ac-
cording to Weiss (1992; and Gallman 1966), per capita income rose from
$77.00 in 1820 (in 1840 dollars) to $125 in 1860, implying an average an-
nual rate of growth of 1.2 percent per year.
To place this figure in the context of my indices of real wages, it is useful
to begin by assuming that total output can be described by the aggregate
production function Q = F(K, L, T), where Q = output, K = capital, L =
labor, and T = natural resources or raw materials. I further assume that
Fis Cobb-Douglas, F = AK*L
aT
h, where a + p + 8 = 1.
If labor is paid the value of its marginal product, then
w = pMPL = paQ/L,
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where p = price of output. In rate-of-change form,
(w'tp) = a+ (Q/L),
where "•" indicates the percentage growth rate. Assuming that the ag-
gregate output elasticity of labor (a) did not change, the real wage (w/p)
should grow at the same rate as labor productivity (Q/L) in the long run
if labor is paid the value of its marginal product.
Weiss (1992) has also produced new estimates of the labor force for the
census years 1820-60. According to these estimates, the aggregate labor
force participation rate increased from 0.328 in 1820 to 0.358 in 1860
(computed from Weiss 1992, 37; and U.S. Department of Commerce 1975,
8). Combining the estimates of labor force participation with his estimates
of per capita income, it follows that output per worker increased from
$235 in 1820 to $349 in 1860, or at an average annual rate of 0.99 percent
per year.
Chapter 3 presented occupation- and region-specific indices of real
wages. In chapter 5, the regional series were adjusted for differences across
regions in the cost of living, and aggregate occupation-specific series were
constructed. If the trend rates of growth estimated from these series are
aggregated by weighting by estimates of occupation shares derived from
the 1850 census, the overall growth rate of real wages is 1.01 percent per
year from 1820 to I860.
1
If output per worker and real wages grew at approximately the same
secular rate, it is reasonable to infer, as stated in the introduction, that
economic growth did "trickle down," on average, to the members of the
antebellum working class.
2 Pessimists who maintain that antebellum
growth bypassed the working class evidently cannot base their case on a
failure of real wages to rise in the long run.
It is important to keep in mind that my real wage indices pertain to
daily or monthly wages while Weiss's estimates pertain to annual output.
No series of average annual days worked has been produced for the ante-
bellum period. Scattered evidence, however, suggests that seasonality de-
clined, and annual days of labor increased, over the course of the nine-
teenth century (Gallman 1975; Adams 1982; Engerman and Goldin 1993).
7.2 Real Wages in the Short Run
Although real wages grew in the long run before the Civil War, my new
series reveal considerable variability in the growth rate in the short run,
measured over a period of years (decades or five-year periods, e.g.) or on
an annual basis. Real wages grew in fits and starts, and certain periods
witnessed stagnation and decline.
Although there were differences across occupations and regions, the144 Chapter 7
general cyclic pattern was as follows. Real wages grew starting in the mid-
18205 into the early 1830s, but then growth ceased or reversed direction
in the mid- to late 1830s. Real wages then increased sharply in the early
1840s, declining somewhat in the late 1840s from their early 1840s peak,
but still remaining well above levels observed in the 1820s and 1830s.
Then, from the late 1840s to the mid- to late 1850s, real wages fell.
The finding that real wages fell beginning in the late 1840s is consistent
with much of the previous literature on antebellum real wages and sup-
ports Robert Fogel's (1989) characterization of this final period before the
Civil War as a "hidden depression" for free labor. But the relatively slow
growth of real wages comparing the mid- to late 1830s to the 1820s is a
novel finding and is the consequence of the improved measurements made
possible by the new real wage series in this book.
Some of the variability of real wages in the short run reflects real factors
that influenced either labor demand or labor supply. Because of the pau-
city of good annual economic time series for the antebellum period, it is
difficult convincingly to measure the effect of these shocks quantitatively.
But identifying plausible candidates is not so difficult.
3 For example, the
Midwest experienced severe cycles in railroad construction in the 1840s
and 1850s. The waves of railroad building led to periodic booms and then
slumps in labor demand, putting (respectively) upward and downward
pressure on wages in the labor markets affected by the construction (Fogel
1989; for a contrary view, see David 1987). Perhaps most important, the
Irish potato famine and political upheaval led to a marked increase in
immigration into the United States starting in the late 1840s, dramatically
altering the ethnic composition of Northeastern cities and sizably aug-
menting urban labor supplies (Fogel 1989). From 1844 to 1856, the annual
number of unskilled immigrants entering the country was 950 percent
higher than the average during the 1830s; for skilled artisans, the figure
was 279 percent (computed from U.S. Department of Commerce 1975,
ser. C-132, C-136, p. 111). In the light of these magnitudes, it is plausible
that the immigration shock was an important factor contributing to the
decline in real wages in the 1850s.
4
Nominal factors may have played an important role in generating short-
and medium-run movements in real wages because cyclic movements in
prices were negatively correlated with movements in real wages. If the de-
viation from trend of the real wage of common labor in the Northeast is
regressed on the deviation from trend in the Northeastern price deflator
(both variables in levels are averages over five-year periods, e.g., 1821-25
and 1826-30), the (contemporaneous) correlation between the two was
-0.90 (r = 7.64).
5
While I will argue below that the sign of the correlation should be taken
seriously, it might be claimed that the magnitude is biased away from zero
(too large in absolute value).
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construct the price deflators. Specifically, if wholesale prices fluctuated
more in the short run than retail prices, my real wage indices may be ex-
cessively volatile (fluctuate too much in the short run).
7
Because of the lack of good retail price data for the antebellum period,
it is difficult to respond directly to this criticism. David and Solar (1977)
attempted to show that retail prices were less volatile than wholesale prices
by estimating a regression of the log of their price index on the log of an
index of Philadelphia wholesale prices. The regression coefficient 3 was
positive but less than one, implying that shocks to wholesale prices were
reflected in retail prices, but less than proportionately. Taken seriously,
David and Solar's result would suggest that price deflators based on
wholesale prices fluctuate "too much" in the short run (relative to price
deflators based on retail prices). If this were true, my real wage indices
would be excessively volatile. However, this inference is questionable be-
cause David and Solar's price index and the Philadelphia price index are
not based on a common set of goods traded in the same location.
8 Because
they are not, it is not surprising that 3, as estimated by David and Solar,
was less than one, even if its true value were unity.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile exploring the possibility that retail prices
were less volatile than wholesale prices. I do so by making use of my recent
study of rental housing in antebellum New York, which estimated housing
price indices over the period 1830-60 (Margo 1996). Specifically, I use the
index numbers for 1840 and 1843, a period of substantial deflation in the
general price level. My index of rents in New York City registers a fall
from an index number of 86.0 in 1840 to 63.9 in 1843, or a decline of
-0.297 in log terms (Margo 1996, 623). My overall Northeastern price de-
flator shows a decline from a peak of 118.1 in 1839 to 69.5 in 1844, or a
decline of -0.534 in log terms. Suppose that the ratio of the two, 0.56 (=
0.297/0.534), identifies the relation between annual changes in retail prices
and annual changes in wholesale prices (i.e., the value of 3).
9 I use this
ratio to smooth (dampen) year-to-year movements in the Northeastern
price deflator. I then recompute the real wage series for common labor by
dividing nominal wages by the smoothed price deflator and reestimate the
regression of real wages on prices, both detrended, as described above. If
this is done, the contemporaneous correlation between real wages and
prices is still smaller but significantly negative, -0.83 (t = 4.35). In other
words, even allowing for the possibility that my price deflators are exces-
sively volatile, it would still appear that contemporaneous increases in the
antebellum price level were associated with falling real wages (and vice
versa).
Why would there be a negative relation between changes in real wages
and changes in prices? One explanation might be that nominal wages were
simply unresponsive to changes in the price level—that is, inflation or
deflation had no bearing on the wage-setting process.146 Chapter 7
Using the nominal wage series and price deflators developed in chap-
ter 3, table 7.1 shows wage and price changes over three inflationary-
deflationary episodes—the price rises of the early to mid-1830s; the price
deflation following the Panic of 1837; and the inflation of the late 1840s
and early to mid-1850s, which culminated in the Panic of 1857. Given
enough time to adjust, nominal wages moved in the same general direc-
tion—and, during inflationary periods, at approximately the same magni-
tude—as the price level did over these episodes. Thus, the point is not that
nominal wages were totally unresponsive to changes in prices but that the
response took time.
1
0 Simply put, changes in nominal wages lagged behind
changes in prices.
The lagged response of nominal wages to prices implies that shocks to
the price level could have persistent effects on real wages—real wages
could be below or above their equilibrium level for some period of time
(Goldin and Margo 1992a). Such persistence has been found for other
historical economies, including the postbellum United States (DeCanio
and Mokyr 1977) and therefore may not be very surprising. But it does
raise the question as to the precise mechanisms producing the wage lag.
One possibility is imperfect information (Lucas 1981). Individuals may
have confused changes in the level of prices with changes in the structure
of relative prices, causing them to adjust real magnitudes (labor demand
or supply) in response to deflation or inflation. Given the costs of trans-
mitting timely price information during the antebellum period as well as
the fact that the inflationary episodes involved both absolute and relative
price changes (Margo 1992, 194-95), the imperfect information story is a
plausible one.
In addition to confusion over relative versus absolute price changes,
expectations about the course of future price changes may have played a
role. To understand this point, the distinction between an integrated and
a stationary time series is useful. A stationary time series returns to a fixed,
or normal, level. By contrast, an integrated time series, such as a random
walk, does not return to a fixed level. If the antebellum price level were
thought to be a random walk, the rational expectation of tomorrow's price
level would have been today's. But, if the price level were thought to be
stationary, the rational expectation would be that prices would return to
their fixed level sometime in the future.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, prior to the inflation of the 1830s,
antebellum employers (and workers) may have believed that the price level
was generally stable, at least during peacetime.
1
1 In terms of the discussion
presented above, the price level was expected to be stationary. Wages did
not adjust immediately when prices changed because, for the most part,
such price change was expected to be temporary and prices would soon
return to normal. Hence, it did not pay for workers to demand immediate














































































































































































Note: A "A(ln)" indicates the difference in the logarithm of the variable (w = nominal wage;
p = price level) between dates. Beginning and end dates shown in parentheses; dates like
"57/59" are unweighted averages of years (e.g., 1857. 1858, and 1859). Rows labeled average
are unweighted averages across occupations within a census region. Overall average is the
unweighted average across census regions (e.g., .324 is the unweighted average across census
regions of A[ln/?] from 1830 to 1835/37).
or deflation became abundantly obvious, and persistent, would nominal
wages adjust, possibly abruptly.
1
2 During the inflation of the mid-1830s,
strikes by journeyman cabinetmakers in New York City are said to have
been motivated by the fact that the "price book [giving journeymen's
wages] used by their masters was more than a quarter of a century old . . .
the old book failed to keep up with the cost of living" (Wilentz 1984, 231).
Such shocks to prices led first to confusion, then to a revision of price
expectations, and ultimately to nominal wage adjustments.
To explore the effect of nominal and real shocks further, more and bet-
ter data on retail prices and on real economic activity are needed so that
the timing, the amplitude, and the duration of antebellum cycles can be
more accurately determined independently of movements in the price level
(Calomiris and Hanes 1994). That said, my new wage series may have
some implications for the timing of antebellum business cycles. For ex-
ample, the rise in nominal wages observed in my series of nominal wages
for common labor in the Northeast beginning in 1841 suggests that
economic recovery after the Panic of 1837 in that region may have be-
gun earlier than 1843, as previously thought (see, e.g., North [1961] 1966,
206).
7.3 The Consequences of Declining Real Wages:
Nutritional Status and Poor Relief
All other things being equal, a short-run decline in the real wage meant
a decline in purchasing power and, therefore, in living standards. The de-
cline might be offset by working more, by drawing on savings, or by shift-Antebellum Wages and Labor Markets: A New Interpretation 149
ing into economic activities (e.g., subsistence agriculture on the frontier)
that might have been insulated from downturn. But, for individuals who
had access to none of these options, a substantial fall in real wages could
spell economic hardship or even disaster.
I consider here two consequences of real wage declines. The first con-
cerns nutritional status. Given that food loomed large in antebellum bud-
gets, declines in real wages may have had negative effects on nutritional
intake and possibly, therefore, nutritional status. The second concerns a
strategy to avoid economic hardship in the face of a decline in real
wages—namely, the decision to seek public assistance, or poor relief.
7.3.1 Real Wages and Nutritional Status
Historians have recently begun to examine trends and cycles in height
and weight by age.
1
3 Height and weight by age are measures of net nutrition
or nutritional status. Ingesting nutrients serves three purposes in the hu-
man body—sustaining current physical activity; fighting infection; and,
prior to adulthood, enabling physical growth. When a child or an adoles-
cent suffers a nutritional insult, such as disease or malnutrition, growth is
typically slowed. As long as the insult does not occur too early in life and
for too long a period, adult height is unaffected, although the growth pe-
riod may be prolonged. While, at an individual level, height and weight
are also influenced by genetic factors, such factors tend to cancel out in
the aggregate, at least among the ethnic and racial groups that populated
the United States in the nineteenth century (Fogel 1986; Costa 1993).
Historical research on heights is greatly facilitated by the availability of
abundant military height data. Starting in the eighteenth century, armies
routinely recorded the heights of soldiers to aid in identifying deserters (as
well as to gauge physical prowess). In the American case, such information
is usually reported in so-called muster rolls. Surviving muster rolls of army
regiments, from wartime and peacetime periods, are lodged at the Na-
tional Archives in Washington, D.C.
Analysis of military height data is fraught with technical difficulties.
During peacetime, armies were not randomly selected from the eligible
male population, and minimum height requirements were used as a
screening device. However, because data on height are (approximately)
normally distributed, it is possible to work out reliable techniques for in-
ferring unbiased estimates of mean heights. In addition, the military sam-
ples usually contain enough ancillary information that, by reweighting,
aggregate estimates can be produced.
Margo and Steckel (1983) analyzed one such military sample, derived
from the muster rolls of the Union army. Regression analysis was used
to control for a variety of factors potentially influencing height, such as
occupation, year of entry into the military, and place of birth. For the
purposes of this book, the most significant finding concerned the trend in150 Chapter 7
adult height. Among farmers and the nonfarm rural bora, there were
modest secular increases in height for cohorts bora between 1820 and
1834, but, for both groups, heights declined for cohorts bom between 1835
and 1839 (see also Komlos and Coclanis 1997). Using data for the Ohio
National Guard, Steckel and Haurin (1982) demonstrated that the decline
in height continued for individuals bom after 1840: comparing cohorts
bom in the late 1850s to those bom in the late 1820s, the decline was 2.3
centimeters, slightly less than one inch—a large change by anthropomet-
ric standards (Fogel 1986, 511). Using data on West Point cadets, Komlos
(1987) showed that weight for age and weight for height also declined
among the relevant cohorts.
Consumption goods—more and better food, housing, shelter, and so
on—that produce an increase in average nutritional status are normal
goods; that is, the demand for such goods is increasing in real income. If
the period 1820-60 witnessed rising per capita incomes, how is it possible
for heights to have declined?
One answer invokes negative externalities of economic growth. For ex-
ample, one by-product of antebellum growth was an increased rate of
urbanization. But antebellum cities were death traps and disease ridden.
Exposure to a virulent disease environment, holding diet constant, can
impede physical growth. The results of chapters 4-6 suggest that well-
functioning labor markets promoted economic growth. But high rates of
labor mobility could also spread infectious disease, exposing nonmigrants
to diseases to which they may not have been immune. Rural bom recruits
in the Union army who moved to urban areas at young ages were at
greater mortality risk than the urban bom, presumably because the former
lacked certain immunities compared with the latter (Lee 1997). Regres-
sions estimated by Craig, Haines, and Weiss (1997) on a sample of heights
of Civil War soldiers show significant negative correlations between crude
death rates in the recruit's county of origin and adult height (see also
Haines 1997).
Increases in economic inequality have also been suggested as a factor
behind the decline in nutritional status because height is negatively corre-
lated with income inequality, holding per capita income constant (Steckel
1995). In certain respects, wage inequality increased before the Civil War
(see the discussion later in the chapter), which may have contributed some-
what to the decline. There is also evidence that wealth inequality in-
creased, but this is disputed by some scholars (Williamson and Lindert
1980; Soltow 1992).
Yet another explanation lays the blame on movements in relative prices.
According to Komlos (1987; see also Komlos and Coclanis 1997), various
features of antebellum economic development led to shifts in relative
prices that had deleterious effects on physical growth. In particular, rela-Antebellum Wages and Labor Markets: A New Interpretation 151
tive food prices rose, while the relative prices of other consumption goods,
chiefly manufactured products (such as clothing and shoes), fell. Consum-
ers reacted to these relative price shifts by cutting food consumption rela-
tive to other goods.
1
4
Could movements in real wages per se have been responsible for the
decline in antebellum heights? From a long-run perspective, the answer
obviously must be no because my real wage indices show increases be-
tween the 1820s and the 1850s. However, if attention is restricted to com-
ovements in height and real wages over certain subperiods, the answer to
this question is maybe.
I say maybe because there is no direct evidence linking movements in
height and real wages for the antebellum United States. However, Weir
(1997) has shown that, in the case of nineteenth-century France, mean
adult heights and real wages (measured around infancy and early child-
hood) were positively correlated.
1
5 Assuming that the French relation ulti-
mately reflects positive income elasticities for nutrients at the household
level and that the distribution of nutrients within households did not move
in favor of mothers or their (young) offspring when household real in-
comes fell, then it is plausible to infer that a positive relation between real
wages at the time of infancy and early childhood and adult height also
existed in the antebellum United States.
1
6 Weir's regressions imply that the
elasticity of adult height with respect to the real wage was 0.01, and I use
this figure for my calculations.
1
7
Two cases are examined. The first concerns the data for the Ohio Na-
tional Guard. Cohorts born in the 1850s were 0.8 percent shorter as adults
(173.6 centimeters) than cohorts born in the 1840s (175 centimeters). My
real wage series for common labor in the Midwest indicates a decline in
real wages from the 1840s to the 1850s of -0.132 when measured in logs
(calculated from table 3A.9). This fall in the real wage can explain 16.5
percent (= 0.00132/0.008) of the decline in height.
The second case is the South Atlantic region in the 1830s. Comparing
birth cohorts of the 1830s to those of the 1820s, Komlos and Coclanis
(1997, 440) found that heights declined by -0.18 inches for white male
convicts in Georgia. My real wage series for common labor in the South
Atlantic region registers a decline in log terms of -0.120 from the 1820s
to the 1830s (calculated from table 3A.9). According to Komlos and Co-
clanis's (1997, 440) regression, the mean height of white men born in the
South Atlantic states in the 1820s was 68.06 inches; hence, the decline in
adult height for the 1830s cohorts was 0.26 percent. The fall in the real
wage explains 46.2 percent (= 0.00120/0.0026) of the decline in height.
1
8
In view of the assumption that a French elasticity can be applied to an
American setting, these calculations—particularly for the South Atlantic
case—should be viewed as speculative. However, I do believe that they152 Chapter 7
demonstrate that adverse short-run movements in real wages before the
Civil War could have been factors contributing to what some have called
an "antebellum puzzle" (Komlos 1987).
7.3.2 Real Wages and the Antebellum Welfare Explosion, 1850-60
In the 1850s, the United States experienced one of its earliest welfare
explosions on record. The 1850 and 1860 Censuses of Social Statistics
were the first to report the total number of persons receiving public assis-
tance during the census year. According to the 1850 census, 5.8 per 1,000
persons received public assistance at some point during the year. By 1860,
the rate had jumped to 10.2 per 1,000 persons, an increase of 76 percent
(Kiesling and Margo 1997).
When a society experiences a substantial rise in welfare usage over a
relatively brief period of time, the causes are typically complex. But eco-
nomic factors are likely to be important, particularly in a historical setting
like the antebellum United States, where many members of the working
class lacked access to capital markets or could not easily avail themselves
of other options (e.g., self-employment in agriculture) that might have
smoothed consumption in response to a short-run economic downturn.
In this section, I briefly discuss the findings of Kiesling and Margo
(1997), who used data from the eight-state sample from the 1850 and 1860
Censuses of Social Statistics (see chap. 2) to study the relation between
antebellum usage of poor relief and real wage movements. Here, real
means the nominal wage of unskilled labor deflated by the cost of board,
as measured by the census in 1850 and 1860, and as used in chapters 4
and 5. The basic presumption is that the real wage so defined was a mean-
ingful proxy for the extent to which labor income could provide an ade-
quate diet—that is, if real wages fell, hunger became a possibility.
Because counties were generally responsible for administering poor re-
lief before the Civil War, Kiesling and Margo (1997) specify a model of
the per capita demand and supply of poor relief at the local (i.e., county)
level. The key idea in the model is that demand for relief depends nega-
tively on the real wage as defined above—thus, a fall in the real wage
generates an increase in the number of persons per capita seeking public
assistance. Demand depends positively on the generosity of relief, where
generosity is measured by average expenditures on relief per full-time
equivalent recipient: other factors held constant, greater generosity elicits
a greater demand for relief (see, e.g., the discussion in Lebergott [1976]).
Demand also depends on additional factors, such as the percentage for-
eign born and the extent of urbanization (Hannon 1996). The urban poor
lacked direct access to resources in times of need. Immigrants tended to
have less wealth than the native born and thus were more vulnerable to
economic distress (Ferrie 1999). On the supply side, the key assumption is
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was limited—that is, there was a negative trade-off between generosity (as
defined above) and the number (per capita) provided public assistance.
Equilibrium in the model is achieved when the number of people seeking
relief just equals the number the county is willing to support at a given
level of generosity.
Econometric analysis supports the basic framework sketched above—
namely, that the demand for relief was a positive function of generosity,
supply a negative function—and also demonstrates that increases in wel-
fare usage were positively associated with immigration and urbanization.
But movements in real wages were also a critical factor because the de-
mand for relief, as hypothesized, was a negative function of the real wage.
The magnitude to the relation between welfare usage and real wages was
sufficiently large that fully 30 percent of the rise in per capita welfare us-
age between 1850 and 1860 can be attributed to a fall in the average real
wage as defined above—more than any other single factor (Kiesling and
Margo 1997).
7.4 The Effectiveness of Antebellum Labor Markets
Real world economies are characterized by a never-ending stream of
decisions about how to allocate labor in response to economic opportuni-
ties created by initial conditions (e.g., a regional imbalance in factor pro-
portions) or by economic change (e.g., technical progress in manufactur-
ing). Broadly speaking, labor markets can be judged effective when they
permit these opportunities to be realized relatively quickly, in the manner
suggested by standard economic models of supply and demand.
The findings of chapters 4-6 suggest that antebellum labor markets were
quite effective, in the sense just described. Antebellum labor markets ap-
pear to have been at their best when facilitating the shift of labor out of
agriculture. They were reasonably effective when development necessi-
tated a geographic reallocation of labor, and they were least effective in
keeping the structure of wages intact when growth caused the relative de-
mands for workers with different skills to change.
7.4.1 Sectoral Effectiveness: Farm-Nonfarm Wage Gaps
The shift of labor out of agriculture is the hallmark of modern economic
growth. Typically, labor shifts out of agriculture when technical progress
and capital accumulation raises the relative demand for labor in the non-
farm sector. The antebellum economy certainly experienced a shift of la-
bor out of agriculture. But some scholars have questioned whether this
shift was too slow, causing economic growth before the Civil War to be
slower than it otherwise might have been.
Chapter 4 examined the issue of sectoral effectiveness by measuring the
size of wage gaps between the farm and the nonfarm sectors. The gaps in154 Chapter 7
question pertained to common laborers, chosen because such workers did
not possess skills specific to either sector. The existence of farm-nonfarm
wage gaps for common laborers would be prima facie evidence of a lack
of labor mobility between sectors.
The analysis in chapter 4 established two points. First, wage gaps were
negligible when measured in nominal terms at the level of local labor mar-
kets for labor hired on an average monthly (or daily) basis. Such markets
appear to have been effective, therefore, in allocating labor between farm
and nonfarm uses. Second, the gaps were relatively large in nominal terms
when aggregated to the level of states. However, the gaps diminished again
when the wage data were adjusted for differences in the cost of living be-
tween sectors. Nonfarm labor tended to be employed in areas where the
cost of living was relatively high compared with farm labor.
My results suggest that the antebellum United States did not appear to
suffer from broad sectoral imbalances in the allocation of labor, unlike
some other nineteenth-century economies or less-developed countries to-
day. In essence, the antebellum market for common labor was common to
both the farm and the nonfarm sectors. Economic change that resulted in
higher real wages for common nonfarm labor, therefore, can be presumed
to have had a similar effect on the real wages of common farm labor.
7.4.2 Geographic Effectiveness
Labor markets are effective in a geographic sense when they help guide
the allocation of labor from low- to high-value locations. In responding
to the initial condition of a frontier or to economic change that increased
or decreased the relative demand or supply of labor in one location in
relation to another, antebellum labor markets had a reasonably good, al-
though mixed, record of success.
The United States began the nineteenth century with most of its labor
force—free or slave—located on or near the Eastern Seaboard. In re-
sponse both to these initial conditions and to various economic changes,
primarily technical progress in distribution, labor needed to shift toward
the interior—that is, settle both the Midwest and the South Central states.
In the North, real wages were initially higher in the Midwest than in
the Northeast, providing the appropriate economic signal for east-west
migration. As the Northern labor force shifted toward the Midwest, the
real wage gap between the Midwest and the Northeast declined, as pre-
dicted by a simple economic model of the settlement process. The decline
did not occur consistently in every decade, but, when it did not—such as
for common labor in the 1830s—shifts in the relative demand for labor
that temporarily favored the Midwest appear to have been the reason.
Previous work has suggested that a regionally integrated labor market did
not appear in the North until after the Civil War, but my results suggest
that such a market was already well in place by the 1850s, if not earlier.Antebellum Wages and Labor Markets: A New Interpretation 155
In the South, real wages were initially higher in the East South Central
region than in the South Atlantic, but, in contrast to the North, the re-
gional wage gap did not narrow before the Civil War. The demand for
labor moved against the South Atlantic states; while labor did shift out of
the region, the shift was neither fast enough nor large enough. Some schol-
ars have suggested that the existence of well-functioning markets for trans-
ferring slave labor from east to west promoted a more efficient geographic
allocation of free labor in the South compared with the North (Fleisig
1976; Wright 1978). The failure of the regional wage gap to narrow in the
South, however, is inconsistent with this point of view.
The South also lagged behind the North in real wage growth. As a re-
sult, there emerged a real wage gap for common labor favoring the North
in the 1830s. The timing of the emergence of the gap suggests an important
causal role for early industrialization, which was concentrated initially in
the Northeast. Although the North-South wage gap narrowed somewhat
in the 1850s, the low-wage South was already a feature of the American
economy before the Civil War.
Aside from questions of regional allocation, the antebellum economy
was continuously beset by shocks that left wages relatively high in some
labor markets and relatively low in others. One point of view is that ante-
bellum labor markets did not respond effectively to such shocks, with the
result that wage differentials between locations persisted over long periods
of time. Using data from the 1850 and 1860 Censuses of Social Statistics,
however, I found strong evidence of regression to the mean: a local labor
market with real wages that were, say, 10 percent above average in 1850
would have real wages only 2 percent above average in 1860. Wage conver-
gence of this sort is exactly what would be predicted if labor markets op-
erated effectively to guide migration from low- to high-wage areas. The
remaining persistence in real wage differentials across locations may
very well be due to the effect of location-specific amenities (leading to low
wages) or disamenities (leading to high wages).
Additional evidence of the ability of the antebellum economy to re-
spond to geographic shocks was presented in chapter 6, which examined
one of the most extraordinary natural experiments involving labor mar-
kets in nineteenth-century America—the California Gold Rush. Real
wages rose sharply during the initial years of the Gold Rush and then
declined once labor migrated into the state. Thus, the labor market worked
in the case of the Gold Rush, although it should be kept in mind that the
supply of labor into Gold Rush California was not particularly elastic
when judged by late twentieth-century standards.
7.4.3 The Structure of Wages
The occupational wage series developed in this book reveal that real
wages grew most rapidly for white-collar laborers and more rapidly for156 Chapter 7
common laborers than for artisans. In terms of the trickle-down effects of
antebellum growth, in other words, artisans fared less well than the other
occupation groups.
That the real wages of artisans did not keep pace with the wages of
common laborers supports a view widely held by labor historians.
1
9 Ac-
cording to this view, the growth of manufacturing, with its emphasis on
the factory system, displaced the artisanal shop (Sokoloff 1984). New
methods of production and labor organization led to an increased relative
demand for less-skilled labor and a decline in the relative demand for arti-
sanal skills (James and Skinner 1985). Artisans fought back in various
ways—for example, by attempting to form unions—but ultimately they
could not stem the tide of technological change. The end product of the
shifts in relative labor demand was a decline in the skilled-unskilled wage
ratio, consistent with my estimates of the more rapid growth of common
than artisanal wages in the long run.
2
0
But, while economic development before the Civil War did not enhance
the relative wages of artisans, it did enhance the relative wages of white-
collar workers. Technical progress and organizational change—the fac-
tory system—in antebellum manufacturing, along with improved trans-
portation, led to growth in internal trade and a concomitant increase in
the demand for white-collar skills to cope with the changes (Aldrich 1971).
The wage evidence presented in this book suggests that, before the Civil




There is also evidence that the relative wages of white-collar labor con-
tinued to remain relatively high for several decades after the Civil War.
Goldin (1998; see also Goldin and Katz 1995) has recently estimated ratios
of the wages of white-collar workers to those of factory operatives for the
late nineteenth century. These ratios range from 1.69 for relatively low-
skilled white-collar workers to 4.35 for business managers in the early
1890s (Goldin 1998).
Economic development after the Civil War produced an increase in the
number and complexity of white-collar occupations, so it is somewhat
difficult to make ready comparisons between Goldin's estimates of wage
ratios and any based on my wage series. However, my wage series for
white-collar labor are constructed to pertain to the average clerk, who was
involved in record keeping and (some) management of supplies. Hence,
such labor is probably most comparable to bookkeepers in the late nine-
teenth century, for which Goldin (1998) has also produced an estimate of
the wage ratio: 2.278.
Using decadal averages of wages from the national aggregate series
in chapter 5, my estimate of the white-collar to common labor ratio is
2.07 in the 1850s, about 10 percent below Goldin's estimate for late nine-
teenth-century bookkeepers.
2
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that the relative wage of white-collar labor remained constant, or in-
creased slightly, from the 1850s to the late nineteenth century. The relative
wage in the 1850s was lowest in the Northeast (1.90) and highest in the
South Central states (2.50).
2
3
Economic historians have long wondered whether a Kuznets curve ex-
isted in American history (Williamson and Lindert 1980). By Kuznets
curve, I mean Simon Kuznets's (1955) assertion that inequality first rises,
then plateaus, and finally declines over the course of economic develop-
ment. If the Kuznets curve is interpreted as referring to the relative posi-
tion of educated labor in the wage structure, then my results (and Goldin's)
suggest that the initial, rising portion of the curve can be dated to the
period 1820-60. Wage ratios then either rose slightly or remained constant
between 1860 and 1900. After the turn of the twentieth century, America
experienced a substantial education expansion that increased the supply
of educated labor relative to demand, driving down the returns to school-
ing and the relative earnings of white-collar labor after World War I (Gol-
din and Katz 1995).